The trier may not reach a conclusion of guilt where the facts, established by the evidence, including those reasonably and logically inferred from other proven facts, are rationally consistent with the innocence of an accused. In Carpenter, we repeated the familiar language regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt: "It is axiomatic that any conclusion, reasonably to be drawn from the evidence, which is consistent with the innocence of the accused must prevail. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury's verdict of guilty. On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Under that scope of review and its application, we give deference not to the hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant, but to the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawable therefrom that support the jury's determination of guilt. This, of course, would be directly contrary to our traditional scope of review of jury verdicts, and to the way in which we traditionally employ it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. The rule is that the jury's function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence. We then decide whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the trial court or the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "We first review the evidence presented at trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts expressly found by the trial court or impliedly found by the jury. Just as the principles regarding the necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt articulated in Carpenter are "axiomatic" id., 84 the principles regarding our scope of review of jury verdicts are also axiomatic.Furthermore, "ntent to cause death may be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events leading to and immediately following the death." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Raguseo, supra, 120 that intent must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, because intent to cause the death of a person is an element of the crime State v. This does not "require that each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred from evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt" because this court has held "that a jury's factual inferences that support a guilty verdict need only be reasonable." State v. Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct id., 76 and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom. Intent is generally proven by circumstantial evidence "because direct evidence of the accused's state of mind is rarely available." State v. General Statutes ยง 53a-3 (11)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. "To act intentionally, the defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of the victim. The specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of murder. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. "In reviewing the sufficiency claim, we apply a two-part test.
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